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Pakistan: Countering an Expanding Drug Industry

An Intelligence Assessment

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Pakistan: Countering an Expanding Drug Industry [redacted]

Key Judgments

Information available as of 1 August 1988 was used in this report.

Pakistan, long regarded as a model of promising antinarcotics initiatives, is losing ground to an expanding drug industry. Between 1979 and 1983, the late President Zia-ul-Haq's ban on poppy cultivation, coupled with glutted markets and depressed prices, caused Pakistan's opium output to plunge sharply. Since that time, however, production has escalated. [redacted]

[redacted] that Pakistan has just recorded its fifth consecutive annual production rise, mainly reflecting expansion into largely autonomous tribal areas. Cultivation patterns suggest that Pakistan—which may have been a net opium importer earlier in the decade—is reemerging as a surplus producer. Even larger production gains in landlocked Afghanistan are meanwhile increasing Pakistan's importance as the chief conduit for opiates from that nation. [redacted]

Burgeoning opium cultivation and trafficking are feeding Pakistan's thriving heroin industry, which, [redacted] now constitutes the major narcotics control problem in Southwest Asia. Heroin addiction rates have tripled during the last few years in Pakistan, with attendant spillover into India and other countries in the region. [redacted]

[redacted] much of the heroin traffic from Pakistan is ultimately destined for the United States and Western Europe. [redacted]

Pakistan has faced several major difficulties in its attempts to meet the drug challenge. The most intractable has involved Afghanistan. [redacted]

[redacted]
Domestic security concerns create an additional problem; the government—[redacted]

[redacted]—is reluctant to provoke a violent response from poppy growers and others involved in the drug trade. Finally, [redacted] corruption and poverty work in favor of narcotics interests, whose economic power undercuts potential threats posed by the enforcement or judicial systems. [redacted]

Islamabad has taken action in a number of areas in attempting to deal with its narcotics problem:

- It has intensified efforts to curb local abuse through education and related programs.

- The eradication program has been focused exclusively on geographic areas firmly under government control—[redacted]
- In the area of interdiction, Islamabad has increased personnel and training and racked up relatively impressive seizure statistics. Despite this effort, key trafficking routes remain active, and, [redacted] little has been done to suppress the hundreds of heroin-refining laboratories along the border with Afghanistan. To a large extent, enforcement is characterized by targeting the most expendable elements of the drug trade, while the financiers who control the industry operate with virtual impunity. [redacted]

[redacted] the Pakistani drug trade is vulnerable to more aggressive actions that could complicate trafficking activity. [redacted] grower acceptance of eradication could be assisted by expanded UN- or US-funded development projects beyond those currently operating; burgeoning opium production is vulnerable to greater use of the aerial spray—rather than the manual—eradication program; expanded and more precise targeting against known trafficking networks operating in Karachi and Lahore would complicate export to the West and to regional markets; efforts to monitor and control precursor chemicals manufactured in Pakistan could hamper heroin-refining operations; and workable asset seizure statutes, guidelines for the use of wiretaps, and tougher mandatory sentences would reduce the ability of drug kingpins to exploit [redacted] loopholes within the legal system. [redacted]

The recent death of President Zia could have major implications for future narcotics suppression programs. [redacted]

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Pakistan: Countering an Expanding Drug Industry [redacted]

Pakistan made significant progress in narcotics control earlier in the decade but now is losing ground to an expanding drug industry. [redacted]

[redacted] opium production reached record levels in the late 1970s. The late President Zia's Islamic-inspired ban on opium in 1979 and falling prices caused opium production to decline from roughly 700 metric tons in 1979 to some 45 tons in 1983, sharply curtailing a thriving trade and earning Pakistan high marks as a model control nation. These gains proved to be short lived, however. Pakistani traffickers soon moved into the more lucrative heroin trade and began large-scale refining operations along the Afghanistan border; opium cultivation started rebounding to supply the expanding heroin industry. Pakistan's challenge now is to confront both increased opium production and a well-entrenched heroin industry that has become a dominant force in regional and international markets. [redacted]

Revitalizing Opium Production

[redacted] opium production in Pakistan increased to an estimated 205 tons in 1988, the fifth consecutive annual increase (see table 1). Although this output was only marginally above the 1987 production, it occurred despite a prolonged drought early in the planting season. Moreover, production in two of the major growing areas—Bajaur and Mohmand—was up 80 percent and over 100 percent from the previous year. On the basis of total hectares of poppy cultivation in 1988 and the average yield per hectare in normal years, [redacted] favorable weather in 1988 could have pushed production to about 230 tons. [redacted]

Pakistan's other role as an export conduit is meanwhile being enhanced by major increases in production in landlocked Afghanistan. [redacted]

Afghan production in 1987 was double the estimated output for 1986, thereby continuing a

Table 1
Estimated Opium Production
in Pakistan

Year	Tonnage	Metric tons
1979	700	
1980	100	
1981	100	
1982	60	
1983	45	
1984	50	
1985	70	
1986	150	
1987	200	
1988	205	

pattern of growth that has escalated even more sharply than has Pakistan's (see table 2). Viewed in tandem, production in Pakistan and Afghanistan is rapidly moving toward the estimated records of the last decade. [redacted]

The Heroin Spillover


Among the most visible signs of greater regional opium production is the pickup in Pakistan's heroin industry. [redacted]

annual Pakistani heroin production has rocketed from 6 tons in 1984 to some 30 tons in 1988. During the same period, heroin-processing laboratories have also proliferated. [redacted] there are currently hundreds of refining facilities along the border with Afghanistan; in 1984 [redacted] there were fewer than 30. [redacted]

Table 2
Estimated Opium Production
in Afghanistan

Year	Tonnage	Metric tons
1979	285	
1980	200	
1981	200	
1982	225	
1983	250	
1984	160	
1985	300	
1986	300	
1987	600	

Figure 1
Heroin Addicts in Pakistan, 1984-88



* Data for 1988 is provisional.

[redacted] heroin is Pakistan's—and Southwest Asia's—major narcotics control problem. Current production is enough to supply much of the estimated 10 tons of Southwest Asian heroin exported to the West each year, while also satisfying the rapidly increasing demand within the region itself. Islamabad, for example, claims that its heroin addict population has reached 660,000, almost triple the government's estimate in 1980. [redacted]

[redacted] (see figure 1). Press reports indicate that this increase is similar in countries such as India and Iran where opium is used heavily. [redacted]

The Drug Industry: Protecting Its Own Interests

Pakistan's narcotics interests have realized most of their gains by expanding into areas outside effective government control. The principal area of production is in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas,¹ a region that directly adjoins the key opium areas of Afghanistan and that is dominated by [redacted] Pushtun tribes on both sides of the

border. [redacted] opium cultivation has steadily moved northwest over the past few years. This has taken it away from settled areas, where provincial and federal laws prevail, to merged areas, where Islamabad shares nominal authority with the tribes, or to tribal areas, where the government has no sway. [redacted]

[redacted] some 40 percent of Pakistan's record opium harvest in 1979 originated in settled areas. In contrast, [redacted] virtually all current production comes from merged or tribal areas close to the Afghan border (see figure 3). [redacted]

Such areas are arid, rocky, and generally inferior to land in the settled zones, but Pakistani growers are compensating by increasing the hectares dedicated to opium poppy. [redacted] for example, some 11,600 hectares were given over to poppy cultivation this year, an increase of 16 percent over 1987. Especially significant jumps have taken place in the tribal areas of Bajaur and Mohmand, which were


¹ The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) is a territory separate from the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). The NWFP has nominal authority over the FATA, however, and for convenience in this paper we use NWFP to mean both the NWFP and the FATA.

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Figure 3
Shifting Opium Cultivation in Pakistan, 1978-88



considered minor growing regions in 1983 but now account for two-thirds of Pakistan's total production (see table 3). A similar though even more dramatic jump in poppy cultivation is meanwhile continuing in Afghanistan, thereby furthering that nation's dependence on the Pakistani export corridor (see table 4).

Trafficking Routes, Methods, and Developments

The NWFP has always been crucial to the narcotics industry in the area:

For the Afghans, the province is the major export gateway. Other exits are limited to the Soviet Union or Iran, and only a small portion of Afghan shipments use corridors other than the NWFP.

Drug trafficking in the NWFP involves a myriad of individual steps and personal client relationships. In broad terms, the bulk of the opium originates along the Afghan-Pakistani border where [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it is bought by dealers from individual farmers. It is then sold to brokers at commercial centers in the area and subsequently passed to independent refiners for processing into morphine base or heroin.

[REDACTED] central to these processing operations are precursor chemicals that are obtained in Pakistan, [REDACTED]. The processed and unprocessed cargoes typically change hands several times as they proceed through the NWFP, with pack animals and porters using the area's labyrinth of some 300 trails and passes into Pakistan to advantage, [REDACTED]. In Pakistan regional wholesalers arrange for transportation—mainly

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Table 3

Pakistan Opium Production, 1986-88

	1986	1987	1988	Metric tons
Bajaur	33	51	91	
Dir	30	90	49	
Gadoon	56	27	4	
Kohistan	3	5	3	
Malakand	0	0	...	
Mohmand	16	23	47	
Other	9	2	11	
Total ^b	150	200	205	

^a Not measured.^b Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.

through peaceful Baluchistan Province—and sales to organizations primarily in Lahore and Karachi [REDACTED] Pushtun domination of Pakistan's trucking industry aids the transshipment process, [REDACTED] as does the free flow of refugees throughout the country. [REDACTED]

Servicing International and Regional Markets

The [REDACTED] efficiency of Pakistani drug operations is reflected in increasingly large shipments—including 100-kilogram heroin cargoes—moving routinely through Pakistan.

[REDACTED] These shipments are contributing to the growing importance of Karachi, which,

[REDACTED] may receive about half of all the heroin produced in the NWFP. Drug dropoff points abound along the main highways leading into the city. Following dropoffs, [REDACTED] private vehicles [REDACTED] retrieve the shipments and deliver them to local and international traffickers. [REDACTED]

Primitive though the export system in Karachi appears, its scope is broad and focused primarily on the West. The size of such smuggling operations is, in

Table 4

Afghanistan Opium Production by Province, 1986-87

	1986	1987	Metric tons
Badakhshan	2	91	
Balkh	14	2	
Bamian	...	79	
Helmand	106	113	
Herat	4	24	
Jowzjan	...	6	
Kabol	3	4	
Konarha	11	1	
Laghman	3	1	
Lowgar	2	25	
Nangarhar	127	158	
Oruzgan	1	4	
Paktia	20	1	
Paktika	3	19	
Parwan	0	2	
Other	2	59	
Total ^b	300	600	

^a Not surveyed.^b Because of rounding, components may not add to totals shown.

fact, reflected in [REDACTED] a police investigation of a Pushtun-dominated section of the city—Sohrab Goth—had uncovered 11 underground drug storage facilities, each capable of holding up to 1 ton of heroin. According to local press, a minimum of 3 tons of heroin is stored in the area at any given time, most awaiting shipment to the United States or Western Europe. [REDACTED]

London appears to be a key target. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Earlier in the decade that 80 percent of the heroin entering the United Kingdom originates in Pakistan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] heroin continues to be smuggled to London from Karachi by maritime and air carriers. Many of these operations are set up by a

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The Pashtuns of the Afghan-Pakistani Borderlands

The Pashtuns (Pathans) constitute one of the largest remaining tribal societies in the world. An estimated 15 million—6 million in Afghanistan and 9 million in Pakistan—they inhabit the southern and eastern slopes of the Hindu Kush, a strategic area that includes the fabled Khyber Pass. Pashtun tribal lands are arid, lacking in resources, and overpopulated. Herding and the cultivation of crops, the two traditional Pathan pursuits, no longer sustain the tribal economies; remittances of tribesmen employed elsewhere, government subsidies,

[redacted] make up the deficit.

By tradition, Pashtuns have a fierce spirit of independence, both personal and tribal, and they cling strongly to their tribal identities. Their lives are governed by pashtunwali, the traditional Pashtun code of honor that influences most aspects of tribal life. The code calls for blood vengeance, regardless of cost, for a perceived wrong; asylum to all fugitives; and generous hospitality to all guests. To transgress the code risks disgrace and ostracism and retribution by fellow tribesmen. The tribes find an outlet for their individuality in continuous feuding. Vendettas often exist between tribal subgroups and family groups. Frequently they begin in innocence when a member of one group acts against a member of another in the course of army or police work.

The Pakistani control system in tribal territory is a legacy of British Indian policy developed to deal with aggressive, militant, and frequently hostile Pashtun tribes. The British used various means to monitor the frontier: they established forts and outposts, built roads to connect and supply their military garrisons, engaged in periodic shows of force in the tribal areas, and subsidized tribal leaders. Present government policy toward the tribal territories stresses gradual assimilation, avoiding the use of force or confrontation. Government control is spread through the mechanism of development: schools, hospitals, electric lines, tube wells and irrigation projects, and especially roads.

Pashtuni family said to have large heroin caches in the NWFP and family representatives in London and Karachi. [redacted] the family is also involved in unspecified smuggling operations to the United States. [redacted]

India also figures increasingly in Pakistani export operations. [redacted]

[redacted] as much as half of all Southwest Asian heroin ultimately destined for the West transits India. [redacted] multihundred-kilogram shipments are typically transported across the porous border from Sind and southern Punjab Provinces by camel caravans. Ultimately destined for Bombay and other key outlets to Western Europe, these cargoes are seldom threatened [redacted]

[redacted] India's own escalating heroin abuse—a byproduct of the country's increasing exploitation as a transshipment center—is also acting as a magnet for the Pakistani drug merchants. [redacted] heroin abuse—virtually unknown in India before 1980—is currently sweeping the country's major cities, with some 220,000 addicts in the capital and Bombay alone.


The last export channel exploited by the Pakistanis appears to go through Iran. [redacted]

[redacted] that these operations are dominated by ethnic Baluchis who export some of the heroin produced in the NWFP and a large amount of that refined in Baluchistan for consumption in Iran or eventual transshipment to the West. [redacted]

[redacted] an Iranian national living in Pakistan as a political refugee is facilitating the smuggling of heroin from the Pakistani-Iranian border, an activity [redacted] relatively common to the refugee population. Shipments subsequently are said to move through Iran and Turkey and then into Western

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Europe. The scope of these operations is suggested by the recent reported seizure of 200 kilograms of heroin by Turkish authorities and the arrest of Iranian couriers. [REDACTED] the shipment was part of the political refugee's Pakistani-Iranian operations. [REDACTED]

Assessing Government Efforts at Control

Pakistan is attempting to keep up with its resurgent narcotics industry through an antinarcotics strategy that features eradication and interdiction programs

targeted primarily against the export trade. The government is also increasingly relying on educational and social initiatives to combat rising domestic abuse. [REDACTED] these efforts have previously had some inhibiting effect.

Barriers to Control

Over the past few years, Pakistan has faced several major difficulties in attempting to counter an invigorated drug trade. The most intractable has focused on Afghanistan. [REDACTED] thousands of Afghan tribesmen rely on the export of opium as a hedge against the unstable markets for legitimate crops.

[REDACTED] Kabul, meanwhile, has virtually no resources with which to counter the drug trade. In addition, the Afghan Government lacks access to many producing areas, and large numbers of people it seeks to win over are engaged in poppy cultivation. In adhering to a policy of noninterference, Kabul—and the Soviet occupation forces—has, [REDACTED] fostered an agricultural environment conducive to the cultivation of opium, with the Pakistan export corridor the major market route.

Islamabad's own stated political objectives with regard to Afghanistan—keeping open the supply lines to the Afghan resistance in the NWFP and protecting refugees in the area—have posed additional obstacles. To avoid jeopardizing these goals, the government occasionally has been forced to avoid certain drug control initiatives. In 1986, for example,

[REDACTED] Islamabad decided to bypass Dir as it carried out large-scale arrests of poppy growers in other parts of the country. The exemption of Dir reportedly was given to avoid a violent reaction from farmers in the area that could constrain access to the Afghan frontier. [REDACTED] the same rationale has also figured in previous aborted attempts to close heroin laboratories operating near the border. [REDACTED] any form of intensified antinarcotics effort would, indeed, generate hostilities in the area that would limit access to the frontier.

[REDACTED] Islamabad is increasingly concerned over the growing access opium farmers have to heavy machineguns and other sophisticated weapons apparently obtained from the thriving underground weapons market along the border with Afghanistan. In addition, the traditional militancy of the farmers is being fanned by some drug traffickers, who [REDACTED] give such weapons to farmers in exchange for commitments to provide specified amounts of opium during the next growing season.

Efforts to Date

Although much of Pakistan's narcotics problems center on the Afghanistan question and the issue of effective control of border areas, the government has taken a number of steps to counter the growth in opium production. Even so, production and trafficking have outstripped official efforts to check the problem.

Education. As local addiction has become a growing problem, the government in Islamabad has increased its efforts to curb domestic abuse through education and related programs. Specifically, the government has been active in launching drug awareness drives, stepping up training of medical personnel for demand reduction programs, and expanding a UN-sponsored

The Pakistani Identity

A general sense of Islamic differentiation from Hindu India is the strongest national unifier binding the otherwise socially and culturally dissimilar Provinces of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier. Provincial priorities frequently conflict with national goals.

Centrifugal forces are exacerbated further by the intensity of identification of Pashtun and Baluchi tribesmen with their ethnolinguistic brothers across the border in Afghanistan and Iran. In these regions particularly, secessionist sentiment is a real and recurrent problem.

Rather than trying to enforce the law on the periphery of its control, Islamabad is content to build consensus gradually, allowing a high degree of local autonomy. In the North-West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), this official lightheadedness has been institutionalized by perpetuating the British colonial administrative model, in which there are:

- Settled areas, where the authority of statutory law is supposed to apply fully.
- Merged areas. Transitional zones where Islamabad asserts varying amounts of control appropriate to local conditions.
- Tribal areas. Allow virtual autonomy over internal affairs and are ruled by jirgas (councils) of tribal elders according to premodern custom.

Technically, Islamabad's authority extends only narrowly along the few national highways that run through the tribal areas. Before they can travel elsewhere in these areas, even government agents first must conclude treaties with the traditional elders.

drug suppression in the settled and merged areas serves to drive production deeper into the unpoliced reaches of the tribal areas.

narcotics education component in local schools.

drug treatment centers are increasing and now number 26.

Eradication.

In general, Islamabad has tried to ensure compliance by getting farmers to give up poppy cultivation in exchange for electricity, roads, and other inducements. Thus, the government's policy is to eradicate only in areas firmly under government control and where the United States or the United Nations have development projects. Islamabad's continuing confidence in this strategy is reflected in production in Gadoon, which was cut in half between 1986 and 1987 and this year may be almost eliminated. By the same token, Islamabad's overriding concern for avoiding violence with farmers caused it to cease eradication this year in two other project areas within Buner and the district of Malakand, which had been virtually poppy-free for several years.

poppy cultivation has reemerged in both areas. Meanwhile,

farmers from Gadoon are relocating to a tribal area in Manshera—a previously minor area of production—to grow poppies.

Security concerns also dictate eradication methods. The government began aerial spraying—with helicopters that were reconditioned and outfitted with US assistance—in 1987.

however, fear of provoking violent reactions limited the aerial effort to only about 5 percent of the total eradication program.

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Pakistan's Antinarcotics Apparatus

The Pakistan Narcotics Control Board (PNCB) is the lead organization in drug control. A semiautonomous agency within the Ministry of the Interior, the PNCB was set up in 1978 largely in response to US urging to create a single authority for coordinating antinarcotics efforts. The PNCB provides enforcement, advisory, and supervisory leadership operating through Joint Narcotics Task Force (JNTF) units, hybrid teams attached to PNCB regional offices. In addition to PNCB personnel, JNTF units are staffed by officials from the Provincial Police (a federal force under the Ministry of the Interior), personnel from the Excise and Taxation Enforcement Department (who before 1978 had been involved in regulating the legal vending of opium), and, in some instances, Customs officers. At the request of the PNCB chairman, the Federal Investigative Agency, which is concerned with investigating malfeasance by government officials, can be brought into drug cases.

International sea, air, and land entry or exit points are guarded by Special Drug Enforcement Cells (SDEC) set up by Customs. The objective of the SDEC is to stop the use of Pakistani flag carriers for onward international trafficking. Although they are

concerned primarily with antiterrorist security, federal Airport Security Forces provide some backup to trafficking suppression efforts as well. Along the border with India, Rangers under military command attempt to control all types of smuggling, of which the drug trade plays a prominent part. The Coast Guard is responsible for antidrug support close in-shore, primarily in harbor patrols, while the newly created Maritime Security Agency adds an oceangoing capability to the trafficking suppression effort.

In the North-West Frontier Province, local levies are employed to exercise paramilitary authority, extending to antinarcotics operations. Organizations such as the Frontier Corps, the Frontier Constabulary, and various local Scout units—made up of members of the population they are tasked to control—command respect and show a pragmatic degree of sensitivity toward the people in their jurisdictions.

[redacted]
labor-intensive manual eradication, a process that begins with the deployment of troops to a target area, a subsequent attempt by government officials to have farmers voluntarily plow under their poppyfields and, failing cooperation, destruction of the crop.

Interdiction. Islamabad's program has expanded noticeably since its inception in 1980. Islamabad has increased antinarcotics personnel, stepped up cooperation with DEA and other foreign law enforcement agencies, and improved security at Pakistan's major international airports, including a rigorous luggage inspection system. [redacted] the government is also expanding the maritime interdiction program with its recently created Maritime

Security Agency, which has responsibility for interdiction on the country's territorial waters; a training course in seaborne interdiction was given earlier this year to the new unit by the US Coast Guard.

Such efforts have helped Pakistan compile impressive seizure statistics. [redacted] annual opium and heroin seizures have averaged about 3 tons and 4 tons, respectively, since 1985 and that between 20 and 30 heroin laboratories have been destroyed annually during the same period.

Despite these efforts, the total interdiction effort is being outpaced by the magnitude of narcotics production, processing, and trafficking. Trafficking routes

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out of the NWFP remain active. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] there has been little active suppression of the many heroin laboratories operating along the Afghan border. [REDACTED]

Dramatic increases in heroin seizures, [REDACTED] are more a result of the vast quantities of opiates in the pipeline at any given time [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] key traffickers readily admit that their losses are infrequent and easily absorbed. [REDACTED]

Enforcement. In general, Islamabad has opted for [REDACTED] compiling impressive annual arrest figures that contrast sharply with actual prosecutions. [REDACTED] drug-related arrests in Pakistan have fluctuated between some 10,000 and 26,000 annually during the last few years. Most of these offenders have, however, drawn only fines or short sentences. [REDACTED] many others, exploiting the susceptibility of poorly paid law enforcement and other officials, have avoided arrest by bribes. [REDACTED] some \$1.5 billion is spent annually in country on drug-related payoffs and other actions. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The vulnerability to corruption extends up the enforcement scale. [REDACTED]

Pakistani authorities have assisted DEA investigations, resulting in the arrests of several major Pakistani traffickers in the United States. Nevertheless,

law enforcement agencies in Pakistan generally have failed to apprehend the individuals in country who organize and finance the trade. [REDACTED]

The confidence that such temerity breeds within the drug fraternity has been reinforced by other narcotics cases, such as the separate escapes of two military officers captured

during the largest heroin seizures in Pakistan's drug enforcement history. [REDACTED]

Opportunities for Change

Although the narcotics situation in Pakistan will probably get worse before it gets better, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] individual actions taken now could form the basis of a more comprehensive strategy to reduce the options available to the country's drug industry. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] exerting greater control over opium production in the tribal areas is the cornerstone of any effective antinarcotics program in the future. In Pakistan, vastly expanded development projects—particularly throughout the NWFP—appear fundamental to improving the chances of intensified government eradication measures. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] the government is likely to continue looking for UN- and US-sponsored development projects. In this regard, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Washington has earmarked \$1 million each for such projects in Bajaur and Mohmand. Expanding projects of this sort, [REDACTED] may also improve the receptivity of tribal elements to aerial eradication—[REDACTED]

Expanded [REDACTED] targeted interdiction efforts may also prove fruitful. [REDACTED] traffickers are most vulnerable at points farthest from their areas of control in the NWFP:

- Overland transit points in Baluchistan are vulnerable to interdiction of shipments intended to move west through Iran or east to the major international gateways of Lahore and, especially, Karachi.

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Assessing Legal Options

[REDACTED] addressing at least some of the legal options and other weaknesses that enable the drug barons to operate with impunity offers Islamabad additional opportunities. [REDACTED] reforms that would increase the vulnerabilities of those who finance Pakistan's drug empires could include:

- Establishing a reward system for interdiction and other enforcement successes to weaken the power of drug related bribes.
- Creating workable asset seizure laws—which put the onus on traffickers to prove that their assets are not drug derived—to help fund the reward system. The asset seizure law passed in mid-1987 allows the government to freeze the assets of a drug suspect. But these can only be confiscated if the person is found guilty and sentenced to life in prison—a sentence rarely meted out.
- Clarifying key laws, particularly those involving wiretapping, to enhance enforcement efforts. Although wiretapping is admissible in Pakistani courts, [REDACTED] enforcement officials are reluctant to use it for fear that it will conflict with civil liberties statutes.

• Increasing mandatory jail sentences for drug-related offenses beyond the two years currently on the books to reduce the effectiveness of bribes or intimidation directed at judicial authorities.

• Making mandatory severe penalties for drug-related corruption within the judiciary or the military to increase chances that tough jail sentences would be imposed on traffickers.

• Simplifying the complicated system of high tariffs, import restrictions, and export rebates to reduce opportunities for customs officials to abet smuggling through recording false destinations and other illegal practices.

• Including in the legal code a statute governing the movement of precursor chemicals essential for refining heroin to increase the vulnerability of that part of the Pakistani narcotics industry most threatening to domestic and regional interests.

[REDACTED]

• Efforts by Islamabad to monitor and control precursor chemicals destined for the Afghan side of the border could reduce heroin-refining operations in that country. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

• Heroin labs, particularly in the Khyber area, appear vulnerable to raids by government strike teams. Although the large number of labs currently operating suggests that traffickers could easily sustain additional losses, stepped-up government actions might force traffickers to adopt stricter security measures, thereby slowing processing operations.

[REDACTED]

leaders in Pakistan and India—which also faces increasing heroin flows from Burma and Thailand—are discussing joint monitoring of the cross-border drug traffic between their countries. Prospects for broader regional

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*Impact of the Afghan Settlement on Pakistan's
Antinarcotics Program*

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan could reduce a barrier to narcotics eradication in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province. Islamabad has yet to initiate eradication programs in the border area for fear of provoking a violent reaction by local tribesmen that could endanger both the government's supply lines to the Afghan resistance and the refugees living in the area. As the Soviets pull out of Afghanistan, most of the 3.5 million refugees in Pakistan are likely to return to Afghanistan.

[REDACTED] a limited number of refugees may have already begun to return to Afghanistan. [REDACTED] do not expect a massive exodus of refugees until spring 1989, however, after the Soviets have completely withdrawn.

[REDACTED] the departure of refugees and the reduction of Pakistan's obligation for supplying the Afghan resistance is likely to result in increased pressure from international donors to crack down on drug production and trafficking in the border areas. Nevertheless, [REDACTED] the Pakistani Government will continue to cite security constraints to justify slow movement on the narcotics front. As long as the Najibullah regime is in power in Kabul, Islamabad will want to supply the Afghan resistance and thus

require access to the critical supply routes through the North-West Frontier Province. Regardless of the outcome of Afghanistan's civil war, Islamabad still faces the long-term problem of gaining control over the semiautonomous border area. Any antinarcotics crackdown in the border region will provoke violent opposition and fan secessionist tendencies among the tribesmen, a problem the Government has sought to avoid.

The movement of refugees back to Afghanistan may buy Islamabad some time on the narcotics issue.

[REDACTED] many of the refugees are from poppy growing areas in eastern Afghanistan and probably provided some of the labor that helped increase opium production in the tribal areas. With this labor pool reduced, Pakistan may suffer a temporary setback in opium production. Over the longer term, however, opium output in the region is likely to increase as Pakistani farmers adjust to the new labor market—possibly hiring migrant workers from Afghanistan to help harvest the opium—and refugees returning to Afghanistan start farming their own poppyfields.

cooperation, [REDACTED] have meanwhile been improved by the inclusion of the narcotics issue on the agenda of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation, whose members, in addition to Pakistan, include India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Moreover, increasing numbers of antinarcotics personnel in Pakistan from a broad range of Western nations are setting the stage for improved training and other forms of assistance to local enforcement personnel.

concern over escalating domestic addiction, and, [REDACTED] asserted that a stronger counternarcotics effort will be required in the future. Zia appointed as the new chief minister for the NWFP retired Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq, who took relatively aggressive action against narcotics during a previous tenure in the position.

[REDACTED] the general has already taken steps to reduce drug-related corruption in the area.

Before his death, President Zia-ul-Haq had expressed his increasing

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